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Executive Summary 
Grand attempts to reconcile economics and environmental in-
terests typically fail. with the result that these two groups often 
become opponents in the public arena. Most efforts to bridge in-
tellectual differences have involved economists trying to get envi-
ronmental activists to develop "the economic way of thinking" -
or conversely, ecologists attempting to convert bean-counter econo-
mists to kinder environmental values. 
The time is appropriate for a vecy different approach to devel-
oping common ground between these two groups, both of whom 
are genuinely and often passionately concerned with improving 
the environment and the economy. A good place to start is to 
identify the public policies and activities which would be con-
demned equally by those concerned with the health of the envi-
ronment as by those worrying about the state of the economy. 
Reversing those policies would truly generate simultaneous ben-
efits in both areas of concern rather than involving any compro-
mise in either economic or environmental values. Such action 
does not involve a difficult tradeoff; rather, it involves reaching 
common ground. 
The United States can simultaneously achieve a healthier en-
vironment and a stronger economy by reexamining public policies 
that impede both of these worthy objectives. This report details 
many opportunities for doing so, illustrating that environmental 
and economic objectives are often fully compatible. Nevertheless, 
the challenge to move from ideas to action is a formidable one. 
Each reform proposed here requires butting heads with some 
powerful element of the status quo. But the ability to overcome 
the status quo does exist; it resides in the common desire of the 
vast majority of Americans to protect the environment while enjoy-
ing the benefits of a healthy, growing economy. The changes envi-
sioned here are an attractive indication of the potential for public 
policy changes that can achieve this common ground. In addi-
tion, a focus on common objectives may enhance the ability of 
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the Center for the Study of American 
Business. Christopher Douglass is the 1996-97 John M. Olin Fellow at 
the Center. Michael Orlando is the Louis Rene Gaiennie Fellow at the 
Center. 
1 
environmental groups and economists to work together, produc-
ing longer-term benefits. 
The following six specific reforms are presented as representa-
tive of the findings of our analysis of public policy changes that 
can help the environment and the economy. By no means do they 
exhaust the possibilities. Rather, these examples, we hope, will 
whet the appetites of others to add to the potential for pursuing 
environmental and economic goals together. 
1. Now that the Cold War is over; it is practical to sell off $6.6 
billion of excess chemicals and metals in the Department of 
Defense's Stockpile of Strategic and Critical Materials. This could 
be done over a five-year period to minimize any adverse impacts 
on the markets for these metals and minerals. This sale would 
reduce ecological damage by extractive industries and improve 
the federal government's fiscal condition. 
2. Subsidies (about $1 billion a year) for federal sales of power; 
timber; and other natural resources should be eliminated. This 
can be done by simply charging fully competitive market prices for 
these resources. The same market-oriented approach should be 
used in renting federal lands and other assets. These valuable 
assets should be available to the commercial economy - but only 
if and when the transactions meet the test of the marketplace. Use 
of market prices would simultaneously reduce the utilization of 
these valuable resources and increase revenues available to re-
duce the budget deficit. 
3. All remaining farm subsidy programs, especially those for 
sugar and peanuts, should be cut. The Federal Agriculture Im-
provement and Reform Act of 1996 is eliminating federal produc-
tion subsidies and acreage reduction programs that manipulate 
output and prices of major crops (wheat, feed grains, cotton, and 
rice). This progress toward greater economic efficiency and re-
duced pressure on the environment should be accompanied by 
terminating the remaining farm subsidies, notably for sugar and 
peanuts. Those two crop supports generate the most egregious 
combination of adverse economic and environmental effects. 
4. New Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, and 
other government construction programs that do not pass a realis-
tic benefit-cost test should be terminated. Projects that do not 
meet this standard are a poor investment of society's resources 
(colloquially, many of these are referred to as "pork barrel" projects). 
Over the years, the federal government has funded many economi-
cally and environmentally undesirable construction projects. 
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5. Special tax provisions that artificially encourage the extrac-
tion and use of natural resources should be repealed. The market 
is a useful, albeit imperfect, mechanism for balancing environ-
mental costs against economic gains. When government attempts 
to improve on market forces with tax subsidies, the result is to 
accelerate the use of natural resources while depressing federal 
revenues and increasing the budget deficit. 
6. Government regulations that discourage recycling should 
be rewritten. It may not make sense for government to force recy-
cling when such action will use more resources than it will save, 
but surely the reverse also is true. It is bad policy for government 
to discourage recycling in cases where economic incentives are 
clearly aligned with environmental objectives. 
Addressing these six policy areas will do far more to demon-
strate the benefits of linking economic incentives with environ-
mental concerns than yet another round of theoretical disputations. 
Continued examination of fiscal and regulatory policy is desirable 
to ensure that governmental policies and programs simultaneously 
meet important economic and environmental concerns. Achiev-
ing common ground between ecological and economic viewpoints 
is an important step toward future progress in public and private 
policy. 
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Specific Areas for Public Policy Reform 
This report focuses on three key categories of federal public 
policy- spending, taxes, and regulation- which provide sub-
stantial opportunities for simultaneously achieving environmen-
tal and economic objectives. In each case, specific reforms are 
proposed with these dual characteristics. 
The first - and largest - section is devoted to identifying the 
many federal expenditure programs that waste taxpayer funds and 
environmental resources. Proposals presented here range from 
selling off unneeded stockpiled minerals to charging competitive 
market prices for timber. 
The second section contains an array of tax subsidies that 
arbitrarily encourage the use of natural resources. The third, and 
final, section deals with opportunities for rewriting government 
regulations that have undesirable consequences from both envi-
ronmental and economic viewpoints. 
Reforming Federal Expenditure Programs 
Many government expenditure programs waste both taxpayer 
funds and environmental resources. As shown in Table 1, the 
annual cost of seven of these activities is estimated at $1.2 billion. 
A decision to eliminate them would open up a variety of attractive 
possibilities. 
Selling Off the Strategic Stockpile 
The federal government spends $52 million each year just to 
maintain the $6.6 billion stockpile of strategic materials, most of which 
is not needed, according to the Department of Defense. Liquidation 
of the stockpile would temporarily reduce environmental impacts from 
mining and processing raw ore by increasing the supply of these 
items available to the commercial economy. Furthermore, a pro-
gram to sell off the stockpile would provide new revenue to the trea-
sury, reducing the budget deficit. 
The objective of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling 
Act (50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.) is "to decrease and preclude, where pos-
sible, dependence on foreign sources of supply in case of national 
emergency."1 In 1920, when the events of World War I were still 
fresh, Congress gave the War Department responsibility for acquiring 
supplies and mobilizing industry in case another war should arise. 
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Table 1 
Selected Federal Expenditure Programs which 
Encourage Use of Natural Resources 
Federal Program 




Irrigation subsidies ( 1902-1996 annual average) 2 1 0 
River maintenance subsidies (1995) 221 
Peanut program subsidies ( 1996) 119 
Hard rock mining subsidies (1995) 150 
Grazing subsidies ( 1993) 
Cost of maintaining national defense 





aDisposing of excess stockpiled materials over five years could yield 
additional annual revenues to the federal government of $1.2 billion. 
Source: See text and accompanying footnotes. 
One of the ways of meeting that goal was to stockpile raw materials. 
After years of War Department studies on the nation's defi-
ciency of certain natural materials, Congress made the first appro-
priations for stockpiling in fiscal year 1938. When World War II 
began two years later, the stockpile was still in its infancy. Conse-
quently, it had little impact on the American war effort. 2 
After the war ended, Congress transferred responsibility for the 
stockpile to the National Security Resources Board, then to the 
Office of Defense Mobilization in 1953.3 During the early stages of 
the Cold War, the stockpile grew in prominence, with President 
Eisenhower stating, ''The stockpile is not a marginal program nor 
a residual claimant for resources, but is actually a high priority 
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program, a vital part of the pattern for national security. "4 
Mter several other bureaucratic shifts, responsibility for the 
stockpile came to rest in the Defense Logistics Agency, a branch of 
the Department of Defense. This agency now administrates a stock-
pile of 89 materials with a 1995 market value of $6.6 billion. Main-
taining and administering the stockpile costs the government $52 
million a year. 5 
The Department of Defense realizes that the world has changed 
dramatically since the creation of the stockpile. It reported in May 
1995 that, of the 89 materials presently in the stockpile, 86 mate-
rials worth $6.5 billion are in excess of need (see Appendix Table 
A1). Items in the surplus range from 45,000 short tons of asbes-
tos to 3.9 million pounds of cobalt to 16 million pounds of baux-
ite. 
Clearly, the stockpile program is an anachronistic 
relic of the Cold War. 
The Pentagon now believes that global trade in essential goods 
and services would continue during mobilization before a war and 
after hostilities begin. In fact, the need for some goods in the stock-
pile would actually decrease in the event of war because of the 
curtailment of civilian demand. 6 The only materials which the 
Department of Defense believes justify continued stockpiling are 
minor amounts of iridium, tantalum, and quartz crystal worth $24 
million. 7 Clearly, the stockpile program is an anachronistic relic 
of the Cold War. 
Sixty-four of the 86 surplus commodities are either metals, 
minerals, or ores, with agricultural commodities and other com-
modities accounting for the remainder of the stockpile. Despite 
the recommendations of the Department of Defense, Congress has 
authorized very little sell-off of the stockpile's assets over the years. 
Between fiscal years 1993 and 1995, sales have averaged $24 7 
million each year, the total of which is only 14 percent of the 
stockpile's value. 8 
Why has Congress been so slow in selling off the stockpile's 
assets in an age of large budget deficits? The simple ans·wer seems 
to lie in the political pressure of the groups which produce these 
materials. Adding the government holdings to available supply is 
likely to significantly decrease the market price for many materials 
6 
in the stockpile. The amount of palladium in the stockpile, for 
instance, represents 20 percent of the annual quantity demanded 
for that metal, and the amount of platinum in the stockpile is 5 
percent of the annual quantity demanded. 9 
Instantaneous divestiture would glut the market, lowering the 
market price dramatically for all of the ·materials in the stockpile. 
Thus, a phased program of selling off the items over several years 
would be more appropriate. Announcing in advance the schedule 
of sales would reduce market uncertainty in many segments of the 
mining industry. 
Under the status quo, the continuing presence of the stockpile 
distorts the market for investment in domestic production of these 
materials. Companies are uncertain whether to invest in produc-
tion of a stockpiled material for fear that the government will sell 
off that part of the stockpile. Aware of this, companies tie their 
demand projections to the political winds. Moving the locus of 
economic decision-making from the market to the government has 
created an incentive to invest in lobbying instead of investing in 
new technology or improving production efficiency. 
It is interesting to contemplate the environmental consequences 
of releasing the surplus stockpiled materials. Indeed, 72 percent 
of the commodities in the stockpile are metals, minerals, or ores 
which are mined directly from the earth. Such mining, it is often 
claimed, harms surface and ground waters as well as fish and 
wildlife habitat. For the more delicate metals, such as silver, which 
are embedded in ore, the waste from mining the ore can become a 
significant burden on the ecosystem. 10 Heavy metals resident in 
the ore and chemicals added to the ore to facilitate recovery of the 
silver result in a large volume of waste that poses a significant 
disposal problem. 
A liquidation of the military's stockpile would decrease the in-
centive for companies to mine in fragile areas and, at the same 
time, generate new revenue for the Treasury. Implementing this 
liquidation gradually will ensure that the long term viability of our 
mining industries will not be compromised. Indeed, eliminating 
the incentive to invest in government lobbying will release indus-
try resources for investment in truly productive efforts. 
Eliminating Subsidies in Sales of Natural Resources 
The federal government sells and leases a great variety of natural 
resources in ways that both harm the environment and shortchange 
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the national taxpayer. The following section identifies the ways in 
which the government subsidizes these activities and then puts 
forth some ideas for improving these public policies. 
Modernizing Grazing Fees for Use of Public Lands. Livestock graz-
ing, the single largest use of federal lands in the Western United 
States, has traditionally been heavily subsidized by low grazing 
fees. Many economists believe that this is an unfair burden on the 
taxpayer while many environmentalists believe that such grazing 
has had a deleterious effect on the ecology of the land. Livestock 
tend to congregate near streams or in wetlands where land is sen-
sitive to damage from trampling. 
A liquidation of the military's stockpile would decrease 
the incentive for companies to mine in fragile areas and 
generate new revenue for the Treaswy. 
A 1988 study by the General Accounting Office reported that 
90 percent of federal stream side lands in Colorado managed by 
the government have been degraded, with poorly managed live-
stock grazing being the major cause. 11 These problems have not 
been alleviated since the GAO report was written. 
The Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmen-
tal Ethics has prepared a report delineating the adverse effects of 
livestock grazing on federal lands in the Umatilla National Forest 
in the Columbia River Basin. According to the report's authors, 
"Grazing can alter the composition, structure and function of ter-
restrial. riparian and aquatic ecosystems. Livestock grazing af-
fects fish and wildlife populations, watershed hydrologic functions, 
soil structures, nutrient cycling, habitat characteristics .... "12 
Livestock grazing on federal lands has caused fiscal shortcom-
ings, as well. According to the Congressional Budget Office, main-
taining grazing lands costs the Forest Service and the Bureau of 
Land Management $4.60 per animal unit month (AUM). 13 How-
ever, the 1994 permit fee was only $1.98 per AUM. The average 
value in 1993 of grazing on private lands was estimated at $10 per 
AUM. If federal grazing fees were raised to the private market level, 
revenues to the federal government would rise by as much as $100 
million each year. Setting grazing fees commensurate with market 
prices would result in beneficial environmental impacts as well as 
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positive fiscal effects. 
Some economists would go further than merely raising the fees 
for grazing on federal lands. Because the federal government owns 
such large shares of Western lands (over half of California and 
over 80 percent of Nevada}, they urge sales to private owners of 
some of the land that is now rented for purposes such as grazing. 
(Contrary to public perception, such action would not include sell-
ing off national parks or other pristine property.) 
Other analysts recommend more esoteric approaches, such 
as treating grazing permits as tradable private property rights. They 
claim that this approach would provide security of tenure to ranch-
ers and increase the incentive for good stewardship of the land. 14 
Eliminating the Subsidy for Hard Rock Mining. Under the law gov-
erning mining of hard rock minerals, the General Mining Law of 
1872, mining claims are cheap to procure- between $2.50 and 
$5.00 an acre. This figure approximates the fair market value for 
Western grazing land and farm land in 1872. It is also inexpen-
sive to maintain this mining right; an owner of a mining claim must 
do a minimum of $100 of mining-related work on the property 
each year. The government, however, receives no royalties on min-
erals taken from federal lands under the claim of private individu-
als. 
The original purpose of the 1872 mining law was to promote 
exploration and development of the West by making access to min-
erals inexpensive. In the present day, this law represents little 
more than a give-away of public assets and a windfall to mining 
interests - owners and workers -which encourages environmen-
tally intensive activity. 1s 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the annual value 
of hard rock mining on federal lands is approximately $1.2 bil-
lion.16 Imposing a royalty of 12.5 percent on hard rock mining-
which is commensurate with the existing royalties on coal, oil, and 
gas extraction- could add an estimated $110 million to the an-
nual revenue of the federal government. The exact amount of rev-
enue would depend on the extent to which the imposition of royalty 
payments discourages mining activity. Eliminating the 1872 Min-
ing Law would force the closing of some marginally profitable mines 
and curtail the environmental impact of domestic mining. 
Eliminating Subsidies in Timber Sales. If the U.S. Forest Service 
were a business, its economic assets would put it in the top five on 
Fortune magazine's list of the nation's wealthiest corporations. But 
if it were ranked according to operating revenue, it would fall to 
number 290. And in terms of net income, the Forest Service would 
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be in bankruptcy court. 17 
The Forest Service provides many services to the logging and 
timber industries. The agency manages the growth of the nation's 
public forests, maintains logging roads, and replants logged areas. 
In 1994, the cost of Forest Service operations which directly ben-
efited the logging industry totaled $900 million. Yet, according to 
Forest Service estimates, the 1994 harvest of 4.8 billion board feet 
garnered only $800 million in Forest Service revenue. In some of 
the most environmentally sensitive areas of the nation, such as the 
Rocky Mountain region, Forest Service expenditures exceeded re-
ceipts by about 3-to-1. 18 
The Wilderness Society believes that the actual cost of Forest 
Service operations may be substantially higher. For instance, mak-
ing road bases, which made up 63 percent of total road costs in 
1992, is not counted as an expense associated with forest use. In 
addition, the Forest Service has overstated income by counting 
federal subsidies as revenues. The Wilderness Society estimates 
the total loss to taxpayers to be $614 million in 1993. 
The General Accounting Office has come up with lower loss 
estimates, notably $112 million in 1990. The midpoint of this 
range of estimates, $363 million, reflects the general magnitude of 
the revenue potential of policy changes. Clearly, whatever specific 
numbers are used, significant subsidies are present in federal tim-
ber sales. 19 
Much Forest Service timber is located in environmentally sen-
sitive areas such as steep slopes and wetlands. By compelling the 
Forest Service to account for the full costs of the benefits provided 
to the timber industry and to cover those costs with the price of 
timber sales, the federal government could produce additional rev-
enue of about $100 million a year. Forced to bear the complete 
costs of harvesting, timber companies would be discouraged from 
using the national forest system's most ecologically fragile and sen-
sitive lands. 
Eliminating Farm Subsidies 
Although Congress has voted to phase out most of the agricul-
tural price support programs, those that remain generate some of 
the most egregious economic and environmental damages to Ameri-
can society. 
Eliminating Peanut Subsidies. Holders of peanut production quo-
tas receive generous subsidies from the federal government, while 
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the laws which mandate these subsidies also discourage farmers 
from following environmentally benign agricultural practices. 
In 1995, peanuts under government quota were supported at 
$678 a ton, while the world market price for peanuts was approxi-
mately $350 a ton. 20 As a result, lucky U.S. peanut producers 
earned nearly twice as much as their competitors on the world 
market. This money did not come from the superior quality of the 
American peanut, but from a virtual tax levied on U.S. consumers. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the peanut pro-
gram cost the federal government $119 million in fiscal year 1996. 
However, this is only a portion of the total cost of the peanut sub-
sidy. Since 1981, Congress has transferred much of the cost of 
supporting the peanut program to consumers through higher do-
mestic prices. In 1993, the General Accounting Office reported 
that the peanut program costs consumers $314 million to $513 
million each year in higher prices. As a result of this legislation, 
peanut producers receive subsidies which average $217 an acre. 21 
Agricultural price support progrwns generate some of 
the most egregious economic and environmental 
damages to American society. 
Under present rules, farmers must grow peanuts on the same 
farm two out of every three years to remain in the federal subsidy 
program. This discourages crop rotation and contributes to over-
farming of the land, thus raising the need for more fertilizer, which 
can contaminate water supplies. Also, farmers cannot move their 
peanut production quotas out of the county originally designated 
for production except in special circumstances. Therefore, peanut 
production is locked into certain areas, many of which require more 
fertilizer. 
For instance, peanut production in Georgia, with 45 percent of 
U.S. production, uses 16 pounds of fertilizer per acre while pro-
duction in Texas requires only six pounds per acre. The recently 
enacted Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
allows limited sale, lease, and transfer of quotas across county 
lines. 22 
The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAITA) and the growing influence of the General Agreement on 
11 
Tariffs and Trade (GATI) has significantly complicated the inter-
action of foreign trade and agricultural price supports. Because 
the U.S. government is now required by law to allow free imports of 
most industrial goods, the government cannot restrict the import 
of secondary production of agricultural goods. Thus, producers 
of items like peanut butter face the incentive to move their manu-
facturing outside the United States to obtain cheaper supplies on 
the world market. According to University of Georgia economists, 
over a fourth of the reduction in the use of U.S. peanuts in peanut 
butter during the 1992-93 crop year can be attributed to displace-
ment by imports. 23 
Terminating sugar subsidies would save the federal 
government the cost of administering the loan program as 
well as the expenses of eriforcement of the quota. 
Government programs such as the peanut quota favor the few 
at the expense of the many. In Pennsylvania, U.S. Senator Rich 
Santorum saw that although peanut quota holders were benefit-
ing, his state was losing jobs from a similar program in the sugar 
indust:Iy. Consequently, he proposed dropping the peanut price 
support program: "I have a lot of peanut quota holders in Penn-
sylvania who do not like what I am doing, but I have a lot of jobs 
from Hershey's, which just moved a plant to Mexico because of 
the sugar problem. "24 
Eliminating Sugar Subsidies. The sugar program operates through 
a system of price support loans and import quotas combined with 
tariffs. The government establishes a loan rate price for sugar and 
extends a non-recourse loan to sugar farmers for the value of their 
crops at that price. If the domestic price of sugar falls below that 
minimum price, farmers can default without penalty. The govern-
ment then accepts their sugar crop as full payment. It t~rns around 
and sells the sugar at the domestic market price, absorbing the 
resultant loss. For the 1997 crop, the support price is 18 cents a 
pound, almost twice the current world market rate. 
The law requires that the entire burden of the price supports be 
passed on to the consumer. The government does this by placing a 
high tariff on the sugar that is allowed to be imported. The effect is 
to boost domestic prices above the loan rate price. Because do-
mestic sugar production meets only 85 percent of domestic de-
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mand, the government allows some sugar from favored countries to 
be imported tariff-free. Above that amount, however, the tariff is 16 
cents a pound, which drives up the price of imported raw sugar to 
approximately 25 cents a pound. The agreements under the Uru-
guay Round of GATI require the tariff to drop to 14.45 cents a 
pound by the year 2000. Import prices are still likely to be above 
both the domestic price and the loan rate price. 25 
Sugar producers claim that government intervention is justified 
because nearly all other sugar-producing countries subsidize their 
sugar crops. Indeed, recent studies have estimated that a world 
free-market equilibrium price would be between 14 cents and 17 
cents a pound for raw cane sugar. That price range is significantly 
higher than the current 9 cents a pound rate which is kept low by 
foreign farm subsidies. 
Because the sugar cane indust:Iy enjoys guaranteed high prices, 
sugar producers have been anxious to expand their operations, 
especially in the Southeast, where the climate is most amenable. 
Since 1970, the amount of acreage devoted to sugar production in 
the Everglades Agricultural Area has doubled. Sugar cane now 
occupies more than seven times as much acreage as the next four 
largest commodities in the area combined. Increased sugar cane 
acreage has contributed to lower water quality and has encour-
aged increased chemical use. The Department of the Interior be-
lieves that the sugar cane indust:Iy has significantly contributed to 
the degradation of the Everglades. 26 
Terminating sugar subsidies would save the federal govern-
ment the cost of administering the loan program as well as the 
expenses of enforcement of the quota. Consumers would save an 
estimated $1.4 billion yearly through lower prices. 27 Although 
NAFfA and GATI have included provisions for allowing price sup-
ports to continue, the secondary markets for sugar face no such 
restrictions. Thus, U.S. companies which utilize sugar as an in-
put often import processed materials that include sugar rather 
than buying high-priced domestic sugar. Eliminating the sugar 
subsidy program would be a boon to American consumers and 
American workers while contributing to a healthier environment. 
Eliminating Uneconomical Construction Projects 
In theory, most federally financed construction programs are 
supposed to be economically attractive and, thus, to be worth the 
intrusion on the environment that results. For example, water 
resource projects of the Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of 
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Reclamation are required to pass a benefit-cost test. In practice, 
however, the costs of many of these undertakings are underesti-
mated and the benefits are projected on a very generous basis. 
Frequently, the stated major benefits of reclamation projects 
are agricultural production from the reclaimed land. In many cases, 
however, the output winds up as part of the farm surpluses that 
the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation must buy up under the 
federal government's agricultural price support program. In these 
instances, the real benefits are negative. Both resources and dol-
lars are wasted. But, of course, that is not how the projects are 
shown in the official benefit-cost analyses that justify them.28 
Taxpayers are paying half of the bill for maintaining the 
inland waterway system, thereby lowering costs to 
transporters and encouraging more waterborne traffic. 
Similarly, serious objections have been raised with respect to 
flood control projects of the Corps of Engineers. In focusing on 
protecting many specific areas from even modest amounts of flood-
ing, the Corps has made it more likely that other regions will be 
badly flooded during periods of unusually large spring runoffs of 
melted snow. Controversy rages over whether, on balance, many 
of the Corps' projects do more harm than good, both environmen-
tally and economically. 
At a more technical level, the discount rates used to estimate 
the present value of the future benefits of federal construction 
projects typically assume an artificially low interest rate. Often 
that rate is lower than the Treasury's borrowing rate for money for 
a comparable term. Any interest rate lower than the opportunity 
cost of capital - what the return on the money would be if it were 
invested in commercially competitive private sector activities - is 
a subsidy. That is so because a low discount rate re·sults in over-
estimating the present value of the future benefits that will flow 
from the undertaking. 29 
For example, in 1983, when the Treasury was paying approxi-
mately 12 percent for its long-term money, the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works and the Corps of Engineers were 
using the low interest rate of 7. 75 percent in evaluating these 
projects. Even with that subsidized low interest rate, over $1 billion 
14 
worth of Corps projects showed a very marginal benefit-cost ratio, 
notably 1.1 or 1.0. It is clear in these cases that, if anything ap-
proaching a market rate of interest - or even the lower Treasury 
borrowing cost- had been used, all of these projects would have 
failed the benefit-cost test required by law.30 
In many cases, the estimated benefits from a federal construc-
tion project include a wide range of claimed farm efficiencies, recre-
ational usage and environmental changes, some of which are very 
generously valued. Thus, in the case of the Calleguas Creek project 
in California, the statute specifically provides for including the wid-
est possible range of benefits that could result from a shift in farmer 
decision-making on which crops to plant in a flood plain. 
As in many other cases, Congress is very specific in its instruc-
tions on that project: 'The feasibility study will consider the agri-
cultural benefits using both traditional and nontraditional 
methods."31 In plain English, this means that, if agricultural ben-
efits are not very substantial according to the way that the govern-
ment traditionally calculates them, then the agency should resort to 
other "nontraditional" benefit estimation methods. 
In other instances, Congress tilts the analysis in favor of going 
ahead with specific parts of the project. For example, the chief of 
the Army Corps of Engineers was directed "to base all economic 
analyses of the Sacramento River Flood Control project on the ben-
efits of the entire project, rather than the benefits of individual in-
crements of the project. "32 In that case, proposed add-ons to the 
original project would have to be approved even if they failed to 
pass a benefit-cost test so long as the benefits of the overall project 
continued to exceed the costs. 
Eliminating Subsidies in River Maintenance. Under current law, 
taxpayer money subsidizes inland waterway maintenance by fund-
ing half of the cost of dredging and maintenance. 33 The Inland 
Waterway Trust Fund, which receives its revenue from fuel taxes 
on commercial waterway traffic, pays for the remaining costs. 34 
In fiscal year 1995, the Army Corps of Engineers accepted bids 
for the dredging of inland waterways which totaled $443 million 
for the displacement of 202 million cubic yards of river-bottom. 35 
In one year the government spent over $220 million of taxpayer 
money on dredging alone. Maintenance of locks and port facilities 
are in addition to these dredging expenses. Taxpayers are paying 
half of the bill for maintaining the inland waterway system, thereby 
lowering costs to transporters and encouraging more waterborne 
traffic. 
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Of course, the additional traffic increases the need for more 
maintenance. Increased maintenance, in turn, has become a bur-
den on the ecosystem. According to a Department of the Interior 
report on one such maintenance activity, "Disturbance associated 
with dredge spoils removal resulted in proliferation of nonnative 
weeds that further threaten the site. "36 Straightening out and dredg-
ing waterways contributes to faster water flow and increased dis-
location of sediment. In addition, dredged materials must be 
deposited somewhere, and these deposits can have secondary, 
negative effects. As the Handbook of Dredging Engineering states, 
'The dispersal of fluid mud dredged material appears to have a 
relatively significant short-term impact on the benthic (bottom-
dwelling) organisms within open-water disposal areas."37 
Eliminating federal subsidies to users of inland waterways and 
forcing those users to cover the total costs of river maintenance 
would alleviate overuse of waterways by charging the full costs of 
this service to those receiving its benefit. Firms paying the total 
cost of river maintenance will have a new incentive to look for in-
novative means of transporting their products. 
Eliminating Irrigation Subsidies. The federal government subsi-
dizes irrigation of private agricultural land by funding Bureau of 
Reclamation water projects and then charging farmers a minute 
fraction of the cost. For instance, it is estimated that the Central 
Utah Project in Southern Utah will cost the government, on aver-
age, $350 to provide an acre-foot of water. Farmers, however, will 
pay only $3 for each acre-foot of water. 38 
This project is not unique. Richard Wahl, a former Depart-
ment of the Interior economist, has estimated that, since 1902, 
the Bureau of Reclamation has subsidized projects in the western 
United States to the tune of $20 billion (86 percent of total bureau 
construction costs) or an average of $210 million a year. Recent 
irrigation subsidies have been generous. The Bureau of Reclama-
tion estimated that irrigation subsidies totaled $2.2 billion in 1986 
alone. 39 There is little change in sight. Irrigators are scheduled to 
repay only $3.4 billion of the $21.8 billion cost of construction 
projects, or 15.6 percent.40 
The federal government provides irrigation subsidies to many 
farmers whose crops it also subsidizes. For example, the Bureau 
of Reclamation estimated that $830 million in irrigation subsidies 
in 1986 went to farmers growing subsidized crops. Those federal 
programs continue to this day. 
It is fascinating to contemplate the interrelationship between 
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these two subsidy programs. First, the federal government gives 
farmers the incentive to increase their output through irrigation 
subsidies. Then the government purchases those crops to keep 
prices artificially high to encourage farmers to raise the crops in 
the first place. According to the Department of the Interior, be-
tween 1976 and 1985, an average of 38 percent of the acreage 
served by the Bureau of Reclamation nationwide was used to pro-
duce crops that are also eligible for agricultural subsidies. 41 
The environmental drawbacks to increased irrigation and Bu-
reau of Reclamation projects have been extensively documented 
by the General Accounting Office. For example, the San Luis Drain, 
constructed in 1968 to collect and recycle drainage from farms, 
became a repository for selenium, a trace element which is harm-
less in nature but which, in concentration, is lethal to animals. It 
also causes deformity and higher mortality rates in fish and wa-
terfowl. In addition, increased irrigation increases the salinization 
of lands. When water is applied in agricultural use, the tiny amount 
of salt present in all water is filtered out and remains in the soil. 
The salt must then be removed by using more water. In one water 
district in California, reported crop and land losses due to this 
problem were estimated to be $35 million in 1987. Waterfowl 
habitat in California is estimated to be at a third of its optimal 
level due to water diversion. Ninety-five percent of trout streams 
in central California are no longer available for spawning due to 
damming.42 
Terminating federal government water subsidies would gener-
ate both fiscal and environmental benefits. If users of Bureau of 
Reclamation water were to pay for the construction of dams in the 
western United States, taxpayers would have saved untold bil-
lions over the past century.43 Elimination of the Bureau of Recla-
mation would also avoid millions of dollars for administrative 
expenses. 
Surely, the use of tougher standards in reviewing proposed 
federal construction projects, for water resources or other pur-
poses, would reduce both federal spending and environmental in-
trusion. 
Reducing Tax Subsidies 
Many special provisions in the federal tax code benefit firms 
and individuals engaged in activities that can have a severe im-
pact on the environment. Such provisions range from special treat-
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ment of tax deductions for depletable resources to exclusion of 
parking expenses from employee income. These provisions, spe-
cial exclusions, exemptions, deductions, and credits diminish the 
usual incentive to conserve scarce resources. In fiscal year 1995, 
special tax provisions generated benefits of over $3.8 billion to the 
recipients (see Table 2). 
Use of Percentage Depletion from the Sale of Natural Resources 
Owners of interests in mineral deposits are allowed to reduce 
their taxable income by a percentage of revenue. This provision is 
also allowed for independent oil and gas producers- those who 
produce no more than 1,000 barrels per day of crude oil or 6 
million cubic feet of natural gas or the combined equivalent of 
both. This provision of the tax code is known as the percentage 
depletion allowance and, typically, it results in lowering a company's 
federal income tax liability. 
Through the percentage allowance, qualifying firms are able to 
deduct from their taxable income more than actual costs incurred. 
Arguably, this provision is justifiable on strategic grounds, to en-
sure that our economy does not become too dependent on foreign 
sources of strategic materials. What is not arguable, however, is 
that this special treatment reduces tax revenue to the U.S. Trea-
sury. Moreover, the percentage depletion allowance artificially in-
creases returns to investment in mining and oil and gas extraction. 
This distortion increases, albeit by a minor amount, the portion of 
the economy's resources devoted to these activities relative to other, 
perhaps more environmentally benign activities. 44 
The percentage depletion allowance typically exceeds the ac-
tual costs incurred. However, it is statutorily limited on an annual 
basis to 50 percent of taxable income after all deductions. Unlike 
depreciation used by most other businesses, percentage deple-
tion deductions can exceed the cost of the investment. In 1995, 
the net value of percentage depletion to the companies benefiting 
from it was $1.8 billion. 45 
Special Treatment of Mineral Exploration 
and Development Costs 
For successful investments in domestic oil and gas wells by 
independent oil and gas producers, intangible drilling costs (wages, 
costs of using machinery for grading and drilling, and costs of 
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Table 2 
Selected Federal Tax Subsidies, Fiscal Year 1995 
Provisions which Encourage 
Use of Natural Resources 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion 
Oil and gas 
Other fuels 
Nonfuel minerals 
Expensing of exploration and development costs 
Oil and gas 
Other fuels 
Nonfuel minerals 
Enhanced oil recovery credit 
Capital gains treatment of royalties on coal 
Capital gains treatment of certain timber income 
Exclusion of interest on state and local industrial 
development bonds for energy facilities 














Exclusion of reimbursed employee parking expenses 1,585 
Total benefits to recipients $3,870 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 1997: Analytical Perspectives (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 
70-71. 
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unsalvageable materials) are fully tax deductible in the year in 
which they occur. Integrated oil companies may expense only 70 
percent of their intangible drilling costs; they must amortize the 
remaining 30 percent over five years. Similarly, some investments 
for exploration and development of certain other fuel and nonfuel 
minerals may be expensed rather than depreciated over the life of 
the asset. This treatment is in contrast to the normal tax treat-
ment of investment costs which limits deductions to costs incurred. 
Although the net effect in fiscal 1995 was to increase the tax 
burden on affected firms by $250 million, this provision will gen-
erate a net benefit in 1999. In the year 2000, a tax benefit of $145 
million is estimated to be provided.46 Insofar as extraction activi-
ties are known to be stressful to surrounding ecosystems, this 
special tax treatment is another subsidy which increases invest-
ments in natural resource extraction while reducing Treasury rev-
enues. 
Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit 
Firms investing in enhanced oil recovery operations qualify for 
a tax credit of 15 percent of costs for projects in the United States. 
Through this tax credit, the government is subsidizing the drilling 
of wells which might otherwise be viewed as uneconomical invest-
ments. 
Tertiary, or enhanced, oil recovery constitutes all oil recovered 
after using primary and secondary methods. Primary production 
is oil recovered naturally from reservoir pressure encountered af-
ter drilling a well. This includes oil recovered from natural gas 
expansion, gravity drainage, and aquifer drive. Secondary oil re-
covery is the incremental oil recovered via supplementary meth-
ods such as water, steam, and gas injection. Tertiary recovery is 
the final fractional oil recovered via enhanced methods such as 
solvent chemical injection and thermal methods. 
Costs which qualify for this tax credit include tertiary chemical 
injectant expenses, intangible drilling and development costs on 
qualified tertiary oil recovery projects, and amounts incurred for 
tangible depreciable property. A government tax credit for tertiary 
methods may make an otherwise unattractive or marginal oil field 
investment opportunity economically viable. In 1995, the enhanced 
oil recovery credit resulted in tax benefits to affected firms of $105 
million.47 
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Capital Gains Treatment of Royalties 
on Coal and Certain Timber Income 
Profits on sales of coal under some royalty contracts can be 
treated as capital gains rather than ordinary income. Consequently, 
proceeds from these sales are taxed at a 28 percent maximum rate 
rather than the 39.6 percent maximum tax rate on ordinary in-
come. 
Through these royalty contracts, prospective investors in coal 
mining can receive a higher after tax return than that expected from 
an equally risky ordinary income-generating investment opportu-
nity. This provision provides incentives for investing in coal mining 
above those profit incentives for businesses generating "ordinary 
income." The income from selling some iron ore and timber can 
also be treated as capital gains. 
Eliminating special tax treatment of these income generating 
activities would reduce the environmental damage typically associ-
ated with mining and logging while also cutting the deficit by in-
creasing federal tax revenues. In 1995, these provisions generated 
an estimated tax benefit of $40 million to the affected firms and 
individuals. 48 
Tax-exempt Bonds for Energy Facilities 
Municipally owned electric and gas distribution enterprises ben-
efit from tax-exempt fmancing of their facilities. To varying de-
grees, the reduction in operating costs is passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower energy prices. Thus, this provision discour-
ages energy conservation while reducing federal revenues. 
Investors who purchase the bonds issued to finance construc-
tion of these municipal power plants are generally exempt from 
federal income taxation of the interest on these bonds. Therefore, 
municipal electric and gas utilities are able to borrow at lower 
rates than other enterprises while ensuring their investors high 
after-tax earnings. In this way, tax-exempt financing distorts in-
vestor behavior and contributes to over-investment in municipal 
power plant construction. The additional supply of power-gener-
ating capacity tends to reduce energy prices, discouraging energy 
conservation by consumers. Moreover, the U.S. Treasury forgoes 
the revenue which it normally receives from interest reported by 
taxpayers. 
In 1995, this provision resulted in an estimated tax benefit of 
$255 million to the owners of these bonds. 49 
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Expensing Multiperiod Timber Growing Costs 
Generally, costs must be capitalized if goods are produced for 
inventory. Production for inventory is considered an investment 
and associated costs are treated accordingly, i.e. costs are amor-
tized over time. However, multiperiod timber growing costs are 
exempt from typical capitalization rules and can be expensed 
quickly. Therefore, firms' inventory carrying costs are reduced, 
which reduces incentives to match inventories to current demand. 
The practice of rapidly harvesting and storing timber becomes rela-
tively more attractive since inventory costs are subsidized via the 
tax code. In addition, the resultant decrease in the cost of growing 
timber translates into a decrease in the cost of using timber, dis-
couraging timber conservation. 
In 1995, this provision resulted in an estimated tax benefit of 
$370 million to the affected firms and individuals. 50 
Exclusion of Reimbursed Employee Parking Expenses 
Employees receive a tax-exempt fringe benefit in the form of 
employer-paid parking at or near the place of work. The internal 
revenue code does not require employees to report as taxable in-
come the value of this benefit. This provision eliminates revenue 
to the U.S. Treasury that would otherwise be paid through em-
ployee compensation. In addition, this revenue-losing section of 
the tax code reduces the incentive to carpool or to take public 
transportation, increasing fuel consumption and air pollution. 
In 1995, this provision resulted in an estimated tax benefit of 
$1.6 billion to the affected individuals. This estimate does not 
include the value of employer-owned parking facilities. 5 1 
Rewriting Regulations 
Government expenditures and tax provisions are not the only 
areas presenting opportunities for environmentally and economi-
cally friendly reform. Regulations put in place to address a certain 
ill at a certain time may generate unintended consequences that 
are adverse to the environment, the economy, or both. In particu-
lar, those regulations which specify materials and production pro-
cesses to be used for certain applications tend to "lock-in" specific 
levels of technology, reducing incentives for innovation. 
Examples of this phenomenon are regulations which discour-
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age recycling. As resources become increasingly scarce, firms and 
individuals try to develop innovations, such as recycling, which 
minimize resource use. However, regulations written before recy-
cling became widespread serve to lock producers into prior pro-
duction technology. 
Effects of FDA Packaging Regulations on Recycling 
Citing the authority of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1958, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food pack-
aging material as an indirect food additive. The 1958 law estab-
lishes ambiguous standards of purity which discourage food 
manufacturers from using recycled materials. Many food manu-
facturers which might otherwise profitably utilize recycled materi-
als are compelled to make greater use of virgin materials in 
packaging. 
Through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA regulates 
food additives to ensure that no component will make food dan-
gerous to human health. 52 The regulations also set standards for 
quality of packaging material which comes in contact with food, 
regulating it as an "indirect food additive." To ensure contami-
nants will not migrate from packaging to food, the regulation states 
that packaging must be "suitably pure." To establish suitable 
purity, food manufacturers must test the prospective packaging 
material and submit the results to the FDA for approval in a non-
objection letter. The testing and regulatory review process is costly 
and usually takes several months. 53 
The "suitably pure" standard was originally written for virgin 
material or material coming from a controlled source. But this 
standard is ill-suited for application to recycled materials which 
may come from a variety of changing sources. Whereas industry 
standards may allow one to assume the purity of virgin materials 
is constant, the variability of feed stocks to the recycled materials 
market makes its purity uncertain. 
Should the purity of the recycled material in use change under 
current rules, the food manufacturers must reapply for a new non-
objection letter from the FDA. Due to the uncertainty, analytical 
costs, and time associated with this process, food manufacturers 
are discouraged from using recycled materials in their food pack-
aging operations. Furthermore, where the objective is to avoid 
use of packaging materials likely to allow migration of contami-
nants to food, standards merely specifying purity of packaging are 
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apt to be ineffective. 
Indeed, as far as public safety is concerned, the purity of pack-
aging is irrelevant. What matters for public safety is whether or 
not contaminants migrate from packaging to food. If the nature of 
a material is such that all components are fixed, the level of purity 
is inconsequential in determining suitability for packaging. In con-
trast, even a "suitably pure" material may not be as desirable for 
packaging if the few impurities which do exist in the packaging are 
likely to migrate to food. 
Establishing a clear analytical standard for packaging suit-
ability based on likelihood of contaminant migration would give 
food manufacturers an unambiguous "OK" to continue using re-
cycled material which meets these standards without having to 
reapply for a letter of non-objection every time their recycled mate-
rial feed stock changes. 
Effects of Construction Codes on Recycling 
Since most construction codes were written before recycling 
became popular, recycled products are often locked out of many 
appropriate applications. Many codes are written, not to specify 
performance standards which are the true measure of safety, but 
to specify materials and production processes. Though such codes 
may have been closely correlated with performance standards at 
the time they were written, these codes can deviate dramatically 
from their original objective as technological innovations unfold. 
Innovations in materials and production processes are locked out 
because traditional materials and production processes are "locked 
in" by these out-of-date codes. 
To facilitate their application, codes were developed that often 
rely on "rules of thumb" which are easy to apply at the work site. 
The assumption underlying this approach is that codes can be 
developed which are not only easy to apply but are also closely 
correlated with the standards they seek to promote. 
For instance, if standard writers want to ensure that any floor 
can hold a stipulated minimum weight, they might write a code 
that says "floors must be constructed with support beams at in-
tervals not to exceed 18 inches." Thus, at the time the code was 
written, and given the materials then typically used for flooring, 
the stipulated construction process would readily meet the de-
sired standard. But, as technology changes, the standard may be 
achievable with less material or a different amount of material. 
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However, since the building code stresses the construction pro-
cess or material property rather than the performance standard, 
technological innovations may be discouraged. 54 
This is the case with recycled materials. For example, the Union 
Electric Company of St. Louis developed a process to convert waste 
ash from its energy production operations into blocks of building 
materials. Construction codes around the country are so specific 
that the company had to go all the way to Pittsburgh, Pennsylva-
nia, to find a place where it was legal to use such material for 
building construction. 55 
There are many such codes which specify production processes 
or materials standards rather than performance standards. These 
codes go so far as to specify color and thickness requirements on 
items such as trash bags and toilet stalls,56 requirements which 
may be correlated with the performance of traditional building 
materials but which may be irrelevant measures of the perfor-
mance of recycled materials. If the physical characteristics of re-
cycled materials are related differently with performance than are 
the physical characteristics of traditional materials, these stan-
dards may unintentionally prohibit the use of recycled materials. 
Regulations such as these could be made more recycling-
friendly - and also more amenable to technological innovation -
if they were rewritten to specify performance standards rather than 
requiring certain production processes and material characteris-
tics. 
Conclusion 
This report highlights three areas of public policy that provide 
attractive opportunities for simultaneously furthering environmen-
tal and economic objectives- selected government spending pro-
grams, special federal tax provisions, and particular regulatory 
requirements. In many cases, in each of these categories, policy 
changes would help to achieve a healthier environment and a 
stronger economy. 
In the case of the government programs analyzed here, each 
appears to be a hard-to-defend subsidy to a special interest re-
lated to agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources. Thus, 
their elimination would represent a helpful contribution to the fed-
eral budget deficit while reducing artificial pressure on the nation's 
natural resources. 
Likewise, the various special tax provisions identified here 
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share similar characteristics. Their elimination also would help 
reduce the budget deficit and curb artificial pressure on natural 
resources. 
Finally, regulatory statutes and administrative rules could be 
rewritten so as to eliminate their unintentional bias against the 
efficient use of resources. The two examples provided above illus-
trate the discouragement of recycling. 
This report has suggested just a few public policy changes 




Table A 1 
Excess Items in the U.S. Stockpile of 
Strategic and Critical Materials 
Unit of 
Material Measurement In Units 
Aluminum Metal Ton 62,881 
Aluminum Oxide 
Abrasive Grain Ton 39,113 
Aluminum Oxide 
Fused Crude Ton 216,860 
Antimony Ton 31,249 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 7 
Asbestos - Amosite Ton 34,005 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 1 
Asbestos - Chrysotile Ton 9,783 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 984 
Asbestos - Crocidolite Ton 36 
Bauxite, Metal Grade, 
Jamaica & Suriname Ton 16,576,959 
Bauxite Refractory Ton 212,202 
Beryl Ton 15,023 
Beryllium Copper 
Master Alloy Ton 7,387 
Beryllium Metal Ton 400 
Bismuth Pound 1,107,772 
Cadmium Pound 5,188,352 
Chromite Ore- Chern., 
Met., & Ref. Ton 1,119,087 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 76,138 
Chromium - Ferro Ton 1,170,284 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 13,484 


























Table A 1, cont. Table A 1, cont. 
Unit of In Dollars Unit of In Dollars 
Material Measurement In Units (millions) Material Measurement In Units (millions) 
Cobalt Pound 46,902,663 $1,178.29 Manganese Metal, $23.70 Electrolytic Ton 14,172 
Columbium Group Pound 1,787,528 12.56 
Mercury Flask 127,854 10.74 Nonstockpile Grade Pound 1,083,666 6.93 
Diamonds Bart Carat 2,001,938 8.32 Mica Muscovite Block, 
Stained and Better Pound 4,359,427 120.36 
Diamond Stones Carat 5, 186,144 394.19 Nonstockpile Grade Pound 193,594 5.35 
Diamond Dies, Small Piece 25,473 .92 Mica Muscovite Film, 
Fluorspar Acid Grade Ton 631,711 10.30 1st and 2nd Quality Pound 1,002,827 .17 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 1,297 .02 Mica Muscovite 
Fluorspar Metallurgical Splittings Pound 13,875,617 2.78 
Grade Ore Ton 222,733 6.75 Mica Phlogopite Block Pound 16,718 .07 Nonstockpile Grade Ton 106,651 3.23 Nonstockpile Grade Pound 114,027 .46 
Germanium Metal Kilogram 68,207 18.76 Mica Phlogopite Splittings Pound 1,233,326 6.17 
Graphite Natural 
5,439 $2.57 Morphine Sulf. & Analg., Ceylon Lump Ton Crude & Refmed Pound 62,186 23.69 Nonstockpile Grade Ton 53 .03 
27,023 195.30 Nickel Ton Graphite Natural Malagasy Ton 16,706 6.04 
1,262,387 158.21 Palladium Ounce Graphite Nat. other Nonstockpile Grade Ounce 2,214 .28 than Ceylon, Malagasy Ton 1,933 .35 
Platinum Ounce 439,598 145.26 Indium Ounce 50,205 .48 Nonstockpile Grade Ounce 13,043 4.31 
Iodine Pound 5,281,994 22.03 Quartz Crystals Pound 221,208 .96 
Jewel Bearings Piece 30,237,764 50.56 Quinidine Ounce 2,471,287 7.51 
Lead Ton 485,931 272.71 Quinine Ounce 2,770,091 $5.10 
Manganese Ore, Nonstockpile Grade Ounce 475,950 .88 
Chern. & Met. Grades Ton 1.179,214 61.62 Rare Earths Ton 504 .56 Nonstockpile Grade Ton 437,364 3.51 
Ricinoleic I Sebacic Manganese Dioxide Acid Products Pound 4,608,897 7.93 Battery- Natural Ton 123,275 7 .79 
78.34 Nonstockpile Grade Ton 18,103 .65 Rubber (Natural) Ton 128,867 
Manganese Dioxide Rutile Ton 10,166 4.60 
Battery - Synthetic Ton 3,011 3.31 Sapphire & Ruby Carat 16,260,229 .15 
Manganese, Ferro Ton 1,090,322 374.53 Silicon Carbide Ton 32,148 13.29 
28 29 
Table A 1, cont. 
Unit of In Dollars 
Material Measurement In Units (millions) 
Silver Ounce 49,318,537 $181.64 
Talc - Block & Lump Ton 1,082 . 22 
Talc - Ground Ton 1,089 . 01 
Tantalum Group Pound 1, 773,141 74.41 
Nonstockpile Grade Pound 1,005,738 25.80 
Tin Ton 134,180 744.27 
Titanium Sponge Ton 25,964 155.79 
Nonstockpile Grade Ton 10,866 65.19 
Tungsten Group Pound 58,515,714 181.22 
Nonstockpile Grade Pound 23,796,602 67.73 
Vanadium Pentoxide Ton 719 9.96 
Vegetable Tannin 
Chestnut Ton 8,021 4.35 
Vegetable Tannin 
Quebracho Ton 111,303 36.15 
Vegetable Tannin Wattle Tonz 9,997 5.60 
Zinc Ton 309,465 269.46 
Zirconium Ton 15,991 . 00 
Total $6,537.93 
Note: Nonstockpile grade materials no longer meet the specifications 
of the stockpile, but may be sold in the private market. 
Source: Department of Defense, 1995 Report to the Congress on Na-
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